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IT IS unfortunate that we now have so many writers and speakers 
telling us which side America should take in some foreign conflict, 
and so few emphasiring the common sense of not taking any side. 
IN THIS war-mongering, individuals employing the disguise of 
certain "peace" organirations are tbe worst. It is a daily experi-
ence to note that when one of these " peace" speakers shows up to 
discuss foreign trouble, he is careful to tell us just how to get into 
it-on the side he favors-and not how to stay out of it altogether. 
HEREWITH are a few facts of the sort average Americans sbould 
know- and don't. They are commonly avoided by many editors 
because organired publicity has made them unpopular. 
IN PUBLISHING this I am not affiliated with any organiration. 
THE MOTIVE is not commercial. Since eye-opening observa-
tions in the Orient first interested me in that field, and disclosed 
some of the chronic trickery of politics there repeatedly duping 
Americans here, I have contributed a great deal of m y time with-
out remuneration of any sort to the cause of judging Asiatic events 
by specific facts rather than sensational publicity. 
THIS BOOKLET is prompted by the favorable reception of a 
previous one urging neutrality. Individuals and groups all over 
America ordered copies for personal distribution or supplied costs 
with lists of names to which copies were to be sent. I mailed 
many at my own expense, and from patriotic recipients every-
where came orders for mailings to others. Such response from 
persons in all businesses and professions, in all walks of life, testi-
fied to approval of sober facts rather than pretexts of bate-upon 
neutrality rather tban partisanism-upon keeping needed trade 
ratber tban futile boycotts for spite-upon a national policy of 
sane defense rather than insane offense. 
RALPH TOWNSEND. 
San Francisco, September, 1938. 
Photostats of N . Y. Times items, 1929. 
HOOVER AND STIMSON 
SEEK CHINESE PEACE 
Secretary Confers All Day With 
Diplomats. but Admits We 
Will Not Intervene. 
tv. Y. --r7i-n ~ {. l)e e.uv z r) 
RELIES ON KELLOGG PACT 
To Mobilize World Opinion i 
Ending Sino-Soviet Crisis Is 
Only Course, He Asserts. 
8pecit1 l l '' Th e Nev.J Y o r k T irrLe s. 
WASHINGTON . Nov. 30. - Th e 
Russo-Chinese cr is is in Manchur ia 
occupied the Int ensive attention o r 
President Hoove ~· and Sec reta ry · 
Stimson todA y und er circumstances 
In 1929---
SOVIET CANNOT 
SEE STIMSON NOTE 
AS A FRIENDLY ACT 
Litvinoff's Answer Charges 
''Unjustifiable Pressure" and 
Expresses "Amazement." 
RESENTS "INTERFERENCE'' 
WAshington Astonished by the 
Sharp Reply-Stimson at First 
Qratified by Responses. i 
While Ruoao-Chlne~" n•JrOIIaton 
rP~ch ~n ll~tr•ement in the ChlntiH! 
E~•tPrn Rall11·ay diapute, Koeecnr 
chu•cterluo ~timson Pf'&Ce more 
•• not a friendly aet. 
StlmMn •lfpru~u gretlfi.,llllon ..t r.-
oponae of powera, but Ia allent OD 
Soviet erltlci•m. 
' 
In 1929 Soviet troops entered Manchuria. There was 
undeclared war between Chinese and Soviet armies. U. S. 
Secretary of State Stimson timidly urged peaceful settle-
ment. Comrade Litvinoff of the Soviet Union angrily told 
him in diplomatic language that the war was not America's 
business, to shut up, stop meddling. Friends of Soviets in 
America put on mysterious pressure. Stimson hastily 
backed down, saying he didn't mean to call any nation an 
aggressor. 
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Famous Author-Lecturer Convinced 
Chiang Ka i-Shek W ill Win 
Dr Anna ~be etronr. who up.t. Uon -.IUS muat proYe thtlr loylltJ 
for the ~cklll(lttK)'" of eomunm.a.m t.o Ul• o. 8. a . R. The rallb mutt 
w-llh ponUfk:al wor&i, lectured on be Plllloed ot ~- COI'NP'\ poll.., 
c:wnnt eve.nt. for t.he btntflt of • tktan.t. apka. 
half~dum ne .. rtporkD cluat.tred "ALL NATJONI T&OUBLED" 
ln a am.~U attunr room •t tnt 811' "Nut III'Cd.lDI of .ptu.. aU natlocu 
n.ncll Dnte Hottl )"Ut.trdaJ' . llft ht.Yllll eaplonace dllflculU• 
wtth ~1 nonc:hrolam:e ahe .. m thtwt117" ~ berwln the uat tfod 
ukSe quttt.lonl about the SoYkt'a etatet-" Htr wwl!l allnlf1ean\IJ 
ntw P\U'It of 21 &Uotl1ed tnltors. •1owed,tbmumetoa4taau.Uchalt. 
Pft(errtnr t.o dwell exciiiiiYeiJ' 011 Alttr two mon\ha ln U'le Orimt, 
I 
Chtn.a'l trtnale4 battle for life. Dr. 8 tronr torueu ultimate vtetorr 
hmed for mon th&n a dleltk few Chin.l. 
U tbe lloviel'a J:DOIL po\ent prapa- "CHIANG WfHNINO Otrr 
pDdllt, Dr. 8tron(. p.ueecl ~ "A numbfr of tact.Jona cooUnue 
eooulh 1n her pt:roratloo. to dtellm to favw eap.ltu!aUon to Japan or 
1 "~ or phllolophJ and compromise peace," abe ul.d, ' 'but 
munkr." these fadt: In the faoe of Chlana: 
VPBEAVAL DISCOUNTED Kal-shtlfa rrowtnr prt'norill popu-
"h Ia rldlcuioua to uswr~e that larttr, evm In pro~s prevk1us1J 
the ne• arreal.l lndle.ILI • trtmf'D- bOIWe to him." 
dout upheaval aptn.t I!Jt.alfn end Ruasla, 1M atd, Ia W~lltlnr China 
tbe rovnnnwnt," 1h1 aid, but that ~t.lnoc ~~ be pe~lv• 
..;~~:n/! :~~~:~ .·:e~~~·;J-ilii!l(j!IMI'Ifili!IPI'!!!!!!:!I"!!~~ 
have meant dtJfntratlon, lhould 
ellrn.lnated. 
~ workel'l ofRusala are 
dbturbed bJ the preaent lltuatl 
'M\er ue not. rebelllnr. Nor a 
~:~ .r:::~t;~;:·, ~~~"::;.~- Mill. M""'~!MiPililo!l!l'lll'."'[ 
tooth comblnr or publle ortlclab. l1nd ·AUdltoriUlll this evenlnl on 
ln5tlluted In order lO tl&hten the ""nle Soflets In a warrln1 world-
OrJanlr.atlon ap.lru.t the lnf,vitableiRu.wJ• P'llfh\A 101" Puce." under 
pn"ure or ,.u. I U!!pkea of the Amerkan Ruw u 
- All pe-noa. •~ under lnvto~tlp- Imtltutt. 
"Russian forces mobilized on the 
northern frontiers keep at least part 
of Japan's army occupied," she said. 
"Russian pressure brought on the 
eague of Nations defining Japan 
the aggressor nation has llkewi 
asslllted to a cer tain exterrt." 
Dr. Strong will lectur~ ~t Dream-
•--
When Soviets invaded Manchuria 
and fought Chinese in 1929, U. S. 
papers kept the affair rather hushed 
up. Compare this with their violent 
sensationalism two years later, in 
193 1, when japanese fought in the 
same a rea. 
When the Soviets fought in Man-
churia, the League didn't send a del-
egation to gather evidence-didn't 
imply anybody was an aggressor. It 
hastened ro do both in the case of 
j apan In 193 1-32. The same Lit-
vinoff (known also as Finkelstein) 
who told the U. S. to stop meddl ing 
and shut up in 1929 cal led for League 
and . S. condemnation of J apan in 
1937. Both the League and America 
has tily obeyed. 
Red publicity and diplomatic machinery are strong 
enough in America, Britain, and France to define the "ag-
gressor" always in favor of Moscow. Above item hints how 
League decisions are arranged. Chinese got no League or 
U.S. backing when fighting Soviet reds-got plenty as soon 
as they fought Jap~nese, who are anti-red. 
[ 3 l 
Book at top was published by a leading 
red writer in 1933. It pictures Chinese 
civilians allegedly killed by Chiang Kai-
shek's party. Chiang was fighting reds 
then. 
Book- at right published in 1938 typifies 
new emphasis, though author of it is not 
known as red writer. It pictures Chinese 
civilians assumedly killed by Japanese. The 
U. S. public is expected to forget that the 
same charges now made against Japanese 
Government were made against Chinese 
Government prior to its present red al-
liance. 
Different Emphasis 
While Dictator Chiang Kai-shek of China fought 
Chinese reds, who variously controlled about an eighth the 
population of China, red writers in America reviled Chiang 
as a fiendish butcher. As soon as Chiang made peace with 
the reds and allied with them, publicity here began to 
describe Chiang as a kindly, fatherly leader, horrified at 
Japanese bombings. 
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Soviet Aims 
The Soviet Union has long sought control of China. It 
has backed the Communist faction within China. Japan 
opposes the prospect of a red China. This makes Japan an 
enemy of the Soviet Union .' 
The Soviet Union wants American aid against Japan. 
This partly explains why reds were eager to see conflict be-
tween China and Japan. Such a war, it was hoped, would 
ally America and Moscow. Warrant for this statement may 
be found in writings of bolshevik leaders, too lengthy to 
quote here. 
Bear in mind that it was a Chinese Communist faction, 
directly allied with Moscow, that kidnapped Chiang Kai-
shek to force him into war with Japan. Concerning this 
bolshevik scheme to have America fight Japan for Moscow's 
convenience, the following statement of red strategy is in-
forming: 
"Our salvation would be more readily assured if the 
imperialist powers (meaning, in this case, America and 
Japan) became embroiled in a war. If we are forced to 
tolerate such scoundrels as the capitalistic thieves, each one 
of whom is whetting his knife against us, then it is our im-
mediate duty to turn these knives against each other." 
-From the speech of Lenin to the Moscow unit leaders of the 
Communist Party in Russia, Nov. 26, 1920. Collected Works of Lenin, 
Vol. XXV. 
Why any ally of Moscow, such as China, is always sen-
sationalized in America as a victim of "aggression" is ex-
plained in the following statement of red philosophy: 
"Every war which the Soviet League will wage will be 
a defensive and a just war, regardless of whoever starts it." 
-From the Soviet writer L. S. Diegtyarev, in his book, Political 
Work in the Red Army, 1930, page 15. 
[ 5 ] 
The Soviet aim to get a "capitali st" nation as an ally 
for convenience in attacking any opponent of the Soviet 
Union is informingly set forth thus: 
" . . . . we can form a military alliance with another 
bourgeoisie (capitalist country), so that we can crush a third 
bourgeoisie by means of this . . . . In this form of national 
defence-a military alliance with bourgeois states, it is the 
duty of the comrades in such a country to help this alliance 
to victory." 
-From a speech by Bukharin at the Fourth Wor ld Congress of 
the Comintern, 1922, quoted in Red Militarism, by Peter Garwy, 1928. 
The gentle kindliness of the Soviet theory, and the de-
gree of sincerity in red publicity in America voicing pained 
horror at J apanese bombings, may be estimated from the 
following: 
"Revolution is founded on intimidation-it kills in-
dividuals, it intimidates thousands. Thus a conscious minor-
ity dynamically conve,rts itself into a majority by slaying its 
main opponents and terrorizing the rest." 
-From Leon Trotsky, former ly commander of the Soviet a rmies. 
Quoted from page 191 of China in Revolution, by H. F. MacNair. 
Recent statements by ruling Soviet officials show that such aims are 
sti ll part of the Soviet creed. 
From the plainest of evidence it is clear that reds do 
not object to loss of life as such-they merely sensationalize 
that which may aid in stirring resentment against their 
enemies, and aid in gaining an American alliance against 
anti-red nations on the pretext of fighting for "democracy." 
The "democracy" the reds have in mind of course means the 
Soviet variety. 
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Photostat, N . Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1936. 
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Seven Months Before W ar Broke-
For years before the present war Chinese reds con-
stantly demanded that Dictator Chiang Kai-shek make war 
on Japan. Moscow utterances meanwhile show leaders 
there hoped for such a war. 
U. S. papers rarely mention that it was Chinese reds, 
allied with another faction, who kidnaped Chiang to fore~ 
him into war on Japan, threatening his life. The photostat 
below, from the Voice of China, published in English in 
Shanghai, shows the sentiment of pro-war Chinese. This 
was published after the July 7, 1937, incident, but before 
serious fighting began and while peace was still possible. 
To stir hatred of Japan, U. S. papers avoid mentioning such 
pro-war clamor in China, representing the Chinese as hav-
ing done all possible for peace. 
t~ftary~~~ri~~itin-mn: king will make its ultimate decision,-a deci-sion which, if it is to be acceptable to th~ ~"-~~~s~ ~. for ~ar. . . _ :. 
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Photostat of Sat. Eve. Post, issue of May 7, 1938. 
Trade Facts 
Of all the popular sensationalism promoting baseless 
hatred and inviting trouble for us abroad, none better illus-
trates falsities to which ignorant or intentionally misleading 
writers resort than the charge 1 apan has "slammed the door" 
against our products in areas of 1 apanese control. 
Typical is an article in the May 7, 1938, Saturday Eve-
ning Post by Carl Crow. Crow asserted 1 apan has slammed 
the door against U.S. products in Manchukuo, presenting a 
horrifying account of how our sales there are declining. 
Strangely-very strangely-Crow did not include spe-
cific figures on our sales there. Actually, U. S. Dept. of 
Commerce tables show our sales in Manchukuo increased 
at the time Crow says they fell. And nobody has accused 
our Government of juggling figures to be pro-Japanese. 
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Bulletin No. 839 of the U. S. Dept. 
o f Commerce gives data on our Far 
Eastern trade very different from as-
se rtions so often heard. Page 36 of 
thi s accura tely compiled bulletin , uni-
versa lly accepted as correct, presents 
fi gures whi ch refute hate-s tirring sen-
sationalism such as in the Sa turday 
Evening Post a rticle shown opposite. 
U, 8 U£=~:~.':,~.~.~MUC£ 
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SUMMARY 
OF UNITED &'TAT&S TRADE 
WITII WORLD, 1937 
Sales of U. S. goods in Manchukuo increased by about 
a fourth from 1933 to 1934-right after japan's occupation. 
In 1935 our trade slumped all over that part of continental 
Asia. But it slumped only 29 per cent in japanese-controlled 
Manchukuo, while slumping 44 per cent in China, where there 
was no japanese control. 
From 1936 to 1937 our trade gained 6 per cent in 
China. But in Manchukuo it gained 353 per cent-fifty-
eight times as much as in China. Our 1937 sales in Man-
chukuo more than doubled our 4-ye.ar average from 1926-30 
there, when Manchukuo was under Chinese war chief rule, 
and which was a boom period for U. S. exports. 
If the Japanese are. bent on "slamming the door" against 
our products, it is strange they have not done so long ago 
in Japan, where their privilege has never been questioned. 
Instead, Japan ranks as our third largest customer, buying 
about six times as much from us as China buys. 
Photostat, N. Y. Times item, telli ng of a celebration in New York of 
the Revolution in Russia, which occurred Mar. 14, 1917. j acob Schiff of 
Kuhn-Loeb & Co. a rranged a loan to help j apan fight Russia in 1904-05, 
when Russia was under Czarist rule. 
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Not Suspected at the Time 
In 1904-05 U. 5. papers lavishly favored Japan. Many 
Americans didn't know then that such press praise for Japan was 
partly stirred by organized forces here working for revolution m 
Russia. Above item appeared 12 years later, in 1917. 
Backing Japan to defeat the Czar from without aided revolu-
tionaries seeking his overthrow from within . Such facts show how 
newspaper campaigns of hate or praise may be influenced by interests 
not suspected at the time. U. S. papers on the whole favored J apan 
as long as J apan opposed Czari st Russia, but turned anti-Japanese 
after 1917 when Japan became a potential enemy of revolutionary 
Russia. 
[ 10] 
America's Legal Position 
Except as an educational interest in an important event 
of our time, the question of who started the present war in 
China is not legally or logically our concern. 
Whichever side was the aggressor in China, neither side 
is aggressing against us. That is the important point. 
Our obligation to remain neutral is exactly the same 
under international law, whether blam~ for the war lies 
mainly with China or with Japan. 
Agitator Deceptions 
Organized groups seeking to embroil us abroad have 
created much confusion on this point. 
They refer glibly to the Nine Power Treaty and the Kel-
logg Treaty, without quoting the exact texts. They have 
thus generated the notion that these agreements call upon 
America to intervene against "aggressor" nations. 
There is nothing in either agreement to define an "ag-
gressor." Nor is there any reference to hostile action by 
signers even if the "aggressor" could be otherwise defined. 
On the contrary, the very clear aim of the Kellogg Pact 
is to limit the scope of a war if one should occur- not to 
spread it by dragging in nations not originally involved. 
The Nine Power Treaty, which deals with China, says 
nothing about aiding the Chinese if they are involved in war. 
It is not a military alliance. 
Our Treaties for Peace Only 
No known treaty to which America is a party commits 
us to take sides in foreign conflicts. 
Every established principle of our foreign relations pre-
scribes for us a course of strict neutrality when we are not 
attacked and when no nation of this hemisphere is attacked 
from without. 
[II ] 
The Kellogg Treaty 
Here is the wording of the two significant portions of 
the Kellogg Treaty of 1928, exactly as obtained from our 
Department of State : 
"ARTICLE I 
"The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare in the 
names of their respective peoples that they condemn 
recourse to war for the solution of international contro-
versies, and renounce it as an instrument of national 
policy in their relations with one another. 
"ARTICLE II 
"The High Contracting Parties agree that the settle-
ment or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever 
nature or of whatever origin they may be, which may 
arise among them, shall never be sought except by pacific 
means." 
Are these words foreign propaganda? 
Our war agitators invariably refer to anything which 
points out the common sense and legality of our neutrality 
as "foreign propaganda." 
If the text quoted is foreign propaganda, remember that 
it came from our own Department of State, that it was 
endorsed by our government, and that it has been reaffirmed 
by every President of the United States since America signed 
it. 
Remaining portions of the treaty, those not quoted here, 
deal only with methods of ratification, where copies shall be 
kept, etc. America and a few other nations signed the treaty 
on August 27, 1928. Later it was signed by governments of 
practically all the civilized and sem i-civilized world. China 
and the Soviet Union signed it . 
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Four Points to Note 
( 1 ) The Kellogg Treaty does not mention the Orient. 
(2) It does not make us the supposed guardian of 
China or any other backward country. 
(3) It does not involve us in the disputes of other na-
tions. We did not promise to intervene if others should fight. 
We did not guarantee what others would do or not do. 
( 4) America's signature on the Kellogg Treaty spoke 
for America only. We simply said we would not go to war 
if we could stay out of war. That was all. 
Making America an Aggressor 
America's Kellogg Treaty promise has been kept. T here 
is no reason why America should not continue to keep it. No 
nation is molesting us. 
Any nation which goes to war or intervenes with pres-
sure when not attacked is an aggressor nation. 
Eager to aid foreign factions they favor by dragging 
in America, agitators scheme to convert what are now local 
wars into a World War. 
That is one of the things the Kellogg Treaty was de-
signed to prevent. 
Shouting about violations of the Kellogg Treaty by 
others, agitators seek to twist its meaning to have America 
become a violator. 
Partisanism Dangerous 
Any partisan action on the part of America, regardless 
of which foreign faction may be aided or opposed, is in direct 
violation of the moral and legal status of American neutral-
ity. 
[ 13] 
It is in direct defiance of the wish for peace by the over-
whelming majority of Americans. 
Partisanism in foreign wars is not defensive action. It 
is looking for trouble-crossing oceans to find trouble. 
Who's W ho A mong Agitators 
Notice that agitation to involve us abroad is always 
aimed at getting our help for one of the allies of Moscow. 
China is allied with the Soviet Union. So is the Madrid-
Barcelona faction in Spain. 
Every outstanding organization agitating for American 
intervention or partisanism is controlled by known sym-
pathizers with Moscow. This can be proved by checking the 
background of ringleaders. 
Misuse of words has become so general that anything 
advertised fl.S a peace talk is almost certain to be an argument 
for America to meddle in some distant war. Anything 
labelled as a plea for tolerance is equally certain to be a blast 
of warlike hatred against one of the nations which Reds 
don't control and which Reds want America to help crush. 
Check this next time you turn on the radio to hear a 
"peace" plea or a "tolerance" plea. 
[ 14] 
Rarely 
Mentioned . . . 
Sensational papers seeki ng t rouble 
with J apan by ta lk of territoria l ag-
gression a re ca reful not to mention 
the Soviet Union's 1923 seizure of 
Mongoli a, a huge a rea of Chinese 
territo ry. The Soviets still have it. 
The Nine Power Treaty 
Besides misrepresenting the Kellogg Treaty agitators 
seeking to embroil us in Asia refer with equally obvious de-
ceptions to the Nine Power Treaty. 
The Nine Power Treaty was signed Feb. 5, 1922, by 
America, Belgium, Britain, China, France, Italy, Japan, 
Holland, and Portugal. It deals particularly with China, 
but not in the way that agitators claim. 
Here are the significant portions of the Nine Power 
Treaty in the exact text received from our Department of 
State: 
"ARTICLE I 
"The Contracting Powers, other than China, agree: 
" (1) To respect the sovereignty, the independence, 
and the territorial and administrative integrity of 
China; 
"(2 ) To provide the fullest and most unembar-
rassed opportunity to China to develop and main-
tain for herself an effective and stable government; 
" ( 3) To use their influence for the purpose of effec-
tually establishing and maintaining the principle of 
equal opportunity for the commerce and industry 
of all nations throughout the territory of China; 
" (4) To refrain from taking advantage of condi-
tions in China in order to seek special rights or priv-
ileges which would abridge the rights of subjects or 
citizens of friendly States, and from countenancing 
action inimical to the security of such States." 
Points to Note 
In signing this treaty, America did not guarantee China's 
territory or anything else in China. 
We said what WE would do, which was to respect 
China's territory. This we have done. We did not guarantee 
what OTHER NATIONS would do. 
f15] 
Writers even in what the public considers "reliable" 
magazines, such as the Atlantic Monthly, have persistently 
misrepresented this important point. They refer to our 
"guarantee" of China's territory. The word guarantee does 
not appear in the Nine Power Treaty, nor is it in any way 
implied. 
Our Promise to Discuss 
Only one reference appears in the Nine Power Treaty 
to action in the event violations should be charged. Each 
signer promised to discuss the matter-that is all. The exact 
wording is as follows: 
"ARTICLE VII 
"The Contracting Powers agree that, whenever a sit-
uation arises which in the opinion of any one of them 
involves the application of the stipulations of the present 
Treaty, and renders desirable discussion of such applica· 
tion, there shall be full and frank communication be-
tween the Contracting Powers concerned." 
Notice that the text says there shall be "frank com-
munication" between signers. "Frank communication" is 
a long jump from armed intervention or warlike boycotts. 
Our Promise Kept 
America promised to discuss matters if any government 
accused another of violating the Nine Power Treaty. No-
body can say we failed to keep that promise. We have had 
discussion and almost nothing else but. 
With thousands of barrels of ink used for sensational 
articles about our Nine Power Treaty obligations, it is un-
fortunate that so few publications have seen fit to quote the 
exact words of that treaty. 
Quoting it correctly would not serve the publicity aims 
of those who want to see America embroiled in Asia. 
[ 16] 
Who Wanted the China War? 
As previously emphasized, America's legal position re-
specti ng the war in China i the same, regardless of which 
side was the aggressor. 
There is no more justification for us to be involved in 
the present strife between China and Japan than in the late 
war between Bolivia and Paraguay. 
For us, as neutral spectators, the question of who started 
the China war has been sensationalized out of all proportion 
to its proper significance. 
Legally, the question has no significance for America. 
We are not the world's judge, jury, or umpire. 
But because of the publicity emphasis given the "ag-
gressor issue", an inquiry into evidence is in order. The 
purpose of such an inquiry here is not to show that this or 
that nation was responsible for the conflict. Rather, the pur-
pose is to show the difference between rumors and realities, 
and thereby call attention to some of the absurdities of agi-
tators now seeking to involve America. 
Opinions Abundant-Facts Scarce 
Much of what has been asserted by popular writers 
about the China: war can not be proved at all, and has no 
basis of reputable testimony. 
Some of the commonest statements heard daily from 
promine.nt people are known by every careful investigator 
to be untrue. 
Conservative investigators are not ashamed to say "We 
don't know" when queried on variou points. As in the case 
of the World War, full information on various points may 
not be available until long after the strife. Violent positive-
ness at this time is rather a mark of ignorance or dishonest 
propaganda than of knowledge and sincerity. 
[ 17] 
Demand for Sensationalism 
A modern war is always a product of many complex in-
fluences. Foreign intrigues, secret treaties, secret assurances 
in return for outside aid, factional ambitions- all may be 
operative. 
The mob mind can not sort and evaluate complex evi-
dence. It wants issues summed up in one or two sentences, 
with all blame on one side and all right on the other. Circu-
lation demands of modern newspapers and magazines have 
increased the market for sensational and inaccurate writing. 
Qualified scholars will not stoop to it. 
Front Rank Men Seldom Heard 
Far Eastern specialists of the front rank rating of Pay-
son Treat, Herbert Gowen, J. 0. P. Bland, W. E. Soothill, A. 
E. Hindmarsh, E. T. Williams, H. F. MacNair, Sir Reginald 
Johnston, H. G. W. Woodhead, K. S. Latourette, Paul Clyde 
and a dozen or so others have seldom been wanted as con-
tributors to popular publications. 
Such men aim at accuracy, not lurid excitement. They 
emphasize facts, not opinions. Their personal sympathies 
may lie with China or with Japan. But they are awar~ of 
too many pros and ~ons to permit broadside barrages of hate 
toward either. 
To such men, the present war in China is a supreme 
tragedy for both belligerents, not an occasion for rabble jeers 
and campaigns of hate by those of us who happen to be more 
fortunate just now. 
Neither the Chinese nor Japanese are fighting for fun . 
Hundreds of thousands of men, whatever their nationality, 
do not endure all manner of agonies and die in the mud for 
the tritely asserted causes so often voiced as "expert analy-
sis." It is as impossible to sum up the issues of t he China 
war in a sentence or two as to do so with the American Civil 
War or any other great human upheaval. 
[ 18] 
What is Now Known 
No detailed, authoritative work on causes of the present 
China war, with apparently unprejudiced inquiry into griev-
ances of both Chinese and Japanese, has as yet appeared. 
Only main features of evidence can be outlined here. 
Facts will be kept strictly separate from sentiment, rumors 
and opinions. 
Did Chiang Kai-Shek Want War? 
Accusers of Chiang make these charges : 
(1) Years before the fighting of 1931-32 in Man-
churia, China under Chiang's dictatorship acquired the largest 
standing army on earth, numbering between 2,000,000 and 
2,500,000 men. 
(2) Chiang made anti-Japanism the basis of uniting 
under him China's various "private" armies. 
( 3) Instead of accepting in a conciliatory spirit Japan's 
withdrawal of troops from Suiyuan and other friendly ges-
tures early in 1937, Chiang intensified his anti-Japanese 
program, believing Japan to be weakening. 
( 4) Chiang fostered such anti-Japanese socie.ties as 
the Blue Shirts, a secret society composed largely of Chinese 
officers sworn to oppose Japan at all hazards, whatever Japan 
might do toward conciliation. 
(5) Prominent Chinese, such as Wang Ching-wei, 
who advocated a policy of peace and friendly co-operation 
with Japan, were killed or injured by Chinese groups which 
Chiang did not suppress and which seemed to have Chiang's 
sanction. 
( 6) Immediately preceding conflict last summer, 
Chine,se troops entered and began to fortify the zone border-
ing the Japanese area of Shanghai. By an agreement of 
1932, this zone was to remain demilitarized. 
[ 19] 
(7) Serious fighting last summer began in two areas 
where Chinese troops had no right under treaties to be-on 
the north side of Shanghai and at Tientsin. 
(8) Chiang overruled the efforts of local Chinese of-
ficials to effect a peaceful settlement of the original July 7 
skirmish in North China. 
( 9) Chiang mobilized China's troops on a large scale 
at a time when Japan was offering no threat of war, and was 
attempting peaceful settlement. 
(Comments on these charges will be offered presently by the writer 
of this booklet.) 
Did Japan Want War? 
Accusers of J apan make these charges: 
( 1 ) That the Japanese are a war-mad people, longing 
to conquer the world, and desire to make China the first step 
in this obje.ctive. 
(2) That Japan's annexation of Korea in 1910 and 
military aid in the establishment of the Manchukuo govern-
ment, 1931-32, prove Japan's aims. 
( 3) That the Japanese government is actuated by a 
program set forth in what is called the Tanaka Memorial, a 
memorandum of Japan's avenue of conquest allegedly sub-
mitted to the Emperor years ago. 
( 4) That Japan without provocation attacked in 
China in the summer of 1937 because of the fear that China 
might become stronger if Japan waited, and also because of 
the belief that England and the Soviet Union were then un-
able to come to China's aid because of European affairs. 
( 5) That a sort of religious fervor has been so culti-
vated in Japan, with military emphasis, that average Japanese 
are burning with the desire to die for Japan in wars against 
all the rest of creation. 
f20l 
{6) That there is a military dictatorship in Japan to 
which the general population is in subjection, and that this 
military clique drags the rest of the people into war at will. 
( 7) That leading Japanese financiers and industrialists 
are in league with the Japanese military commanders in 
order to conquer new territory for "slave, labor", supplies, 
and marketS. 
(Comments on tbese cbarges will be offered presently by tbe writer 
of tbis booklet.) 
Did Chiang Want War? 
Tbe following are comments by tbe autbor of tbis booklet: 
China's Army Totals 
It is correct to say that China's armies during years 
prior to the present war in China were the largest in the 
world. Mr. Hallett Abend, long New York Times corres-
pondent in China, with an exceptional record of accuracy, 
quoted 2,500,000 as the total of China's troops in the year 
1930. This figure appears on page 65 of his book, Tortured 
China. 
Mr. H. G. W. Woodhead, Editor of the China Year 
Book, is likewise conservatively careful. On page 242 of his 
Adventures in Far Eastern Journalism, published in 1935, he 
estimated the total of China's troops at 2,250,000. Differ-
ences in estimates arise partly because some of the Chinese 
troops have recurrently deserted the army for a time to 
operate as bandits, then rejoined. 
Possibly t he earlier estimates included the "private 
army" of Chang Hsueh-liang, who ruled Manchuria practi-
cally independent of China before the J apanese occupation. 
Professor A. E. Hindmarsh of Harvard states that t he army 
of "independent" Manchuria numbered 350,000 men in 1928. 
[21] 
China's War Supplies 
Writers in the San Francisco Chronicle and similar pub-
lications have declared that China is without arsenals for 
t he manufacture of weapons. The 1933 China Year Book, 
pages 544-46, gives a list two pages long of Chinese arsenals 
at that time, five years ago. As far back as 1909 the Encyclo-
paedia Britannica listed six arsenals of importance in China, 
some capable even then of turning out heavy guns. 
Every standard work of referehce gives similar informa-
tion for writers and speakers who might by chance wish to 
offer facts , rather than pursue the usual course of concealing 
t hem. 
Before the Japanese took Mukden in 193 1, the Chinese 
arsenal there ranked as one of the largest in the world, re-
putedly employing at its peak some 20,000 men, including 
many foreign technicians. Such facts are familiar to every 
informed student of the Far East. Newspapers commonly 
avoid such facts . The vogue is to picture the Chinese as 
fighting with little better than sticks and ancient swords. 
Just before the present conflict began, red publications 
in both America and China carried awesome accounts of 
China's military might. They claimed China was ready to 
fight Japan, that China could win, and stated they would 
like to see the war start at once. But the minute it began 
the same organizations launched publicity picturing China 
as a quaintly peaceful nation, totally unprepared, pounced 
upon without warning by a tremendously armed foe. 
By the plainest of evidence it is apparent that China 
actually spent far more on armies between 1927 and 1937 
than did Japan. 1 t would have been impossible to equip 
more than two million soldiers with the quality of arms and 
munitions to be seen everywhere in China without spending 
far more than Japan, whose regular troops numbered only 
one ninth as many as China's. 
No Proof of Blame 
That China has led the world in militarism, both in 
numbers of troops and in proportions of taxes diverted to 
military purposes, is not open to intelligent dispute. 
But China's excessive militarism is not in itself proof 
that Chiang Kai-shek, China's Dictator, was planning all 
along to attack Japan. In the interest of fairness, there is 
need of strict separation between surmise and evidence. 
Chiang did not create China's colossal militarism. He 
inherited it. When he became dictator in 1927, various mili-
tary chiefs ruled sections of China as their own domains . 
Each had his huge army. Chiang improved his own army 
till it was the best in China. A deadlock ensued. Chiang 
could not prudently disband his own army in the face of rival 
threats. Nor could he coerce others into disbanding without 
renewing civil wars. Nobody trusted anybody else, for the 
excellent reason that in preceding years practically every-
body in China had betrayed everybody else. 
Chiang's Unification 
Unable to disband these millions of armed men, assum-
ing that he wished to, Chiang set about unifying them under 
his central regime. 
In his unification methods Chiang is open to criticism. 
From the first anti-foreignism was the main creed of his 
party. On his way to power, Chiang's anti-foreignism was 
mainly anti-American and anti-British. When his armies 
took Nanking in March of 1927, his soldiers under Chinese 
officers went from one foreign consulate to another, and from 
one foreign home to another, killing, torturing, plundering. 
The British Consul was shot point blank in his own yard. 
Mr. J. K. Davis, the American Consul, narrowly escaped wjth 
his life. 
[23] 
Anti-Americanism 
Numerous Americans who lived through those days in 
China lost mothers, sisters, fathers or brothers in killings 
which resulted from openly proclaimed Chinese official 
policy.* 
The same Chiang Kai-shek group which perpetrated this 
program of anti-American killings and property destruction 
is now shouting its friendship for America to get our aid 
against Japan . 
There was no valid excuse for this 1927 campaign to 
drive Americans from China. Our residents there were in 
legitimate business. Most of them were ih philanthropic 
work- maintaining schools and hospitals-to which wealthy 
Chinese usually give nothing. Americans had donated more 
than 80 million dollars in American money for hospitals and 
schools, and were giving from five to ten million dollars an-
nually to support these. 
Our total of residents in China was only about an eighth 
the total of Chinese residing in America. America had al-
ways befriended China. We had never taken a single acre 
of territory there. So far as this writer can learn we had no 
mining or railway concessions. American influence had saved 
China from being parcelled out among European powers 
back in the 19th century. America had given back indemnity 
money levied on China after the massacres of 1900 when the 
Chinese Government had ordered all Americans and. other 
foreigners in China slain. 
Chinese Politics 
For decades in Chi.na it has been the fashion to blame 
foreigners for the distress brought on partly by overpopula-
tion and partly by Chinese civil wars and official cruelties. 
• Consult Tortured China, 1930, by Hallett Abend, N. Y. Times corres-
pondent in China; a lso Within the Walls of Nanking by Alice Tisdale Hobart, 
later author of Oil for the Lamps of Cbina; and Ways Tbat Are Dark-Tbe 
Truth About China, by Ralph Townsend, 1933. 
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Probably less than five per cent of China's population can 
read, though the number of Chinese graduates of American 
universities is large. Mass ignorance makes anti-foreign ism 
a natural choice of corrupt politicians. 
After America and England bombarded Nanking to 
rescue foreigners and showed a firm resolve to defend the 
Shanghai Settlement, Chiang's party found that anti-Amer-
ican and anti-British policies did not pay. So Chiang's party 
moderated that tack and began to seek U. S. aid. Chiang 
wanted aid to help him subdue rival claimants for the dic-
tatorship. He promptly got U. S. backing, for reasons too 
devious to relate here, despite just having finished a cam-
paign of anti-Americanism in which much American property 
was burned and in which a number of Americans were killed. 
When U. S. and British backing became assured, Chi-
ang's party shifted the anti-foreign emphasis to Japan. The 
Anglo-Japanese alliance had expired. Bolshevist publicity 
against Japan had been effective in America. Thus iso-
lated, at that time not having either Italy or Germany as 
theoretical allies, Japan was the ideal target-much better 
than America or England- for traditional Chinese anti-
foreignism. 
China's Anti-Japan Campaign 
It seems to this writer that there was no justification for 
the new anti-Japan policy in China. Chinese businessmen 
by the thousands were well-treated in Japan. At that time 
Japan had not occupied Manchukuo, then called Manchuria. 
Japan in 1922 had voluntarily handed back to China 
the former German concessions of railways, etc., in the 
Chinese province of Shantung, which Japan had taken from 
Germany in the World War. Japan's re.turn to China of 
these properties was a generous gesture, very exceptional in 
the history of international dealings. It was particularly 
significant on the part of Japan, which is a relatively poor 
country and in need of outside resources. 
(25] 
Just why the Japanese returned the Shantung properties 
to China, this writer can not say. Japanese papers at the 
time were full of arguments that Japan should take the lead 
in cultivating Chinese good will, and thus open trade rela-
tions with China which would be more valuable than the 
Shantung concessions. This sentiment seems to have been 
strong, for a little later, in 1929, the Japanese Government 
appropriated 72 million yen to establish scholarships for 
Chinese students to study in Japan as "good will" guests. 
Also, the Japanese opened a number of good will hospitals 
in China, financed in Japan, for the benefit of poorer classes 
of Chinese. 
Certainly the anti-Japanese campaign in China did not 
originate with the. Japanese occupation of Manchuria. It was 
provably under way years before that event. 
The Manchurian Conflict 
During the Japanese conflict with Chinese in Manchuria, 
between- 1931 and 1933, Chiang Kai-shek never once took 
the field against the Japanese. That conflict was largely 
between the Japanese and Chang Hsueh-liang, war chief who 
ruled Manchuria as his own province, independent of Chi-
ang's regime in China Proper. 
Japan's investments in Manchuria, consisting mainly of 
the South Manchuria Railway, had begun early in the present 
century. Enlightened Chinese then were appealing for 
foreign capital and technical talent to develop the country. 
There was nothing illegal in such investments. American 
capital was being invested in Canada and elsewhere. I nves-
tors in China did not then foresee the long period of Chinese 
civil wars which would devastate the country and make the 
masses ripe for anti-foreign policies by Chinese politicians. 
Japan's return of the Shantung concessions to China and 
other good will gestures may have placated some of the bet-
ter elements in China. But they failed to halt the anti-
foreignism which was the main political expedient of many 
f26] 
Chinese poli t icians and racketeers. T he failure of Chinese 
officials to halt anti-J apanese campaigns, often resulting in 
violence, aroused bitterness in J apan, coming as they did on 
top of J apanese good will gestures which had meant consider-
ab le sacrifices to J apan. 
Anti-] apanese agitators in China did not propose to buy 
Japanese properties. T heir slogans called for confiscation. 
The Lytton Commission, not favorable to Japan, never-
theless listed more provocations endured by the Japanese 
before going to war in Manchukuo in 1931 than we endured 
before fighting Spain in 1898 or Germany in 1917. 
The precipitating incident of September 18, 193 1, was 
trivial. Insight into preceding irritations may be gained 
from the Lytton Report, particularly the Supplement to it. 
Comparisons 
When the Chinese launched an official program of kill-
ing Americans and other foreigners in 1900, we fought back 
with troops sent to China. We fought back until the Chinese 
agreed to peace and guarantees against such outrages in the 
future . 
When the Chinese repeated their official program of kill-
ing Americans and other foreigners in 1927, when Chiang 
Kai-shek first came into power, we again sent troops to 
China and fought back. We fought back until the Chinese 
officially took steps to halt such outrages against our citizens 
ther«;. This course was in accord with what successive 
American presidents have defined as our obligation to insist 
on respect for civilized principles. 
It is hardly logical for us to be so severely critical of 
the Japanese for fighting now as a result of conditions which 
caused America to fight in China on two occasions within 
the last 38 years. 
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The magnitude of military operations is far greater in 
the warfare in China now. But the principle involved in 
provocations leading up to the conflict is the same as that 
when America fought in China in 1900 and in 1927. 
Anti-Japanese Violence 
It is commonly supposed by uninformed Americans that 
anti-J apanese agitation in China, during years preceding the 
present conflict, was a matter of boycotts and press criticism. 
It was not. The writer of this booklet offers an illustrative 
instance of which he had direct knowledge: 
In Foochow, a South China city, there, were some hun-
dreds of Japanese. They were there as tea buyers, whole-
salers, and other legitimate occupations, entitled to the same 
protection Chinese business men received in Japan. In one 
house lived a Japanese school teacher and his wife. 
Chinese secret societies threatened the life of the school 
te.acher-not, so far as any one could learn, on complaints 
that he had committed any offense-but because it was 
planned to kill him as a demonstration of "Chinese patri-
otism." The Japanese Consul asked the Chine.se officials 
to provide guards for the teacher's home. Chinese guards 
were sent. 
A few days later, mysteriously, the guards suddenly left 
their posts without notice. At once a gang of "Chinese 
patriots" burst into the home and shot both the Japanese 
teacher and his wife. In this case, the charge of the Japanese 
was not that the Chinese officials had ordered the killings, 
but that they had connived at it or permitted it by abr.uptly 
withdrawing the guards without notice at a time when it 
was known a gang contemplated the crime. 
Chiang's Predicament 
Anti-Japanese agitation from 1928 to 1937 was waged 
considerably by Chinese elements - particularly Chinese 
[28] 
Chinese and Japanese at dedication of a new Japanese hospital in 
China, attended by the writer of this booklet, then in the American 
Consular Service. Between 1929 and 1936 Japan donated a number 
of hospitals to China, also opened clinics for poor Chinese, all as part 
of a policy to gain Chinese good will. In all , Japan's policy toward 
China has probably been as creditable as the average of other nations. 
Communists-who hated Chiang. If he coul d be entangled 
in a losing war, reds might hope to gain power in large areas 
of Chin a in consequence of wartime disorganization. 
When Chiang Kai-shek undertook to subdue anti-Jap-
anese lawlessness, his enemies in China shoute.d that he was 
pro-Japanese. Yet to compromise with the anti-Japanese 
elements and officially sanction their violence would invite 
war with Japan. Chiang was in a hard position. Finally 
he yielded to the factions clamoring for war. 
rz9l 
In June of 1936 a South Chin a taction revolted with the 
announcement that its aim was to fo rce Chiang to attack the 
J apanese. T hen in December of 1936 the Chinese Com-
munists, in an alliance with another fact ion, kidn apped Chi-
ang and announced he would be killed unless he agreed to 
war on J apan. War came seven months later. 
The point is not that Chiang Kai-shek himself provoked 
the present war. But it is a matter of plain evidence that 
provocations from the Chinese side were numerous. 
Chiang's Kidnaping 
F rom Madame Chiang Kai-shek's book on the kidnap-
ing of her husband, plus other evidence, it seems plain that 
Chiang had to choose between risk ing his dictatorship in civil 
war or joining the movement to make war on J apan. T he 
Blue Shirts, an organization of anti-J apanese officers in the 
Chinese army, might join the factions against him if he 
refused to side with the factions seeking war on Japan. 
Chinese businessmen and the more stable variety of 
educated Chinese generally seem to have opposed war. The 
common coolie and farmer classes dreaded war. But these 
pro-peace elements were shouted down by the radicals. 
Meanwhile, red propagandists spread the word t hat aid 
from America could be expected if war could be started. 
While affairs were thickening, after Chiang was kid-
naped by reds in December of 1936, Chinese radicals were 
shouting that China, with nine times as many ready troops, 
could win against Japan. 
When Conflict Came 
Probably no foreigner knows positively who began the 
shooting on the night of July 7, 1937. This was in itself 
unimportant. It became serious when the Chiang Kai-shek 
central government of China, under pressure from pro-war 
elements, refused to recognize t he negotiations of local 
[30] 
Chinese officials at the scene of the incident . The local of-
ficia ls seemed ready to settle it peacefully . Chinese radicals 
in Nanking and Shanghai were shouting that the local of-
ficials were sell-outs to J apan, and that Chiang should not 
accept thei r settlement. T his meant war. 
Treaty Provisions 
It is correct to say that serious fighting began in two 
places where Chinese troops under existing treaties had no 
legal right to be. T he two places were T ientsin and North 
Shanghai. 
The treaty whereby Chinese were not to move armies 
into certain areas near Tientsin was not an agreement be-
tween China and Japan alone, but between China and several 
powers, including America. This treaty dates back to the 
settlement of the Boxer massacres of 1900. Foreign powers 
insisted on keeping the route from Peking to the sea always 
open for foreigners to leave in times of danger. 
Evidence of V iolations 
The agreement providing that China was not to move 
troops within a certain distance of the Japanese occupied 
corner of Shanghai was an agreement between China and 
J apan alone. It dates back to I 932, when the Japanese agreed 
to withdraw troops after the battle of Shanghai if the Chinese 
would agree to keep soldiers away from the zone just north 
of the city where they would menace Japanese civilian resi-
dents. So many massacres of foreigners have occurred in 
the past when ignorant Chinese soldiers suddenly ran amuck 
that the J apanese insisted on t hat arrangement. American 
and Brit ish officials signed the agreement as witnesses. 
Photographs published in American newspapers of the 
early fighting at Tientsin and Shanghai, while published with 
hotly anti-Japanese captions, nevertheless showed that the 
warfare began in areas where China had agreed not to move 
troops. 
[3 1] 
Civilian Killings at Tungchow 
What roused Japan more than anything else after the 
July 7, 1937, affair, was news of the slaughter at Tungchow, 
near Peiping, of some 200 Japanese subject&--men, women, 
and infants. American papers gave this e,vent either very 
obscure notice or no notice at all, though it was of great im-
portance in launching the war. 
The Tungchow massacre was perpetrated by Chinese 
soldiers apparently excited by reports that the Japanese had 
been routed and were in retreat from China. Tungchow was 
not a theatre of conflict, and the Japanese families there were 
set upon without warning and slain . Indignation among 
Japanese in Japan ran high, and from that time on-] uly 29 
-a full size war with China was considered inevitable. 
Points of Law 
From the standpoint of international law, the Chinese 
case in respect to origins of the war is not very good. 
When serious fighting began the Japanese garrisons 
were where. they had a legal right under treaties to be. The 
Chine.se soldiers at the same time were where they did not 
have a legal right under the treaties to be. 
So far as this writer has learned, not a single American 
newspaper or magazine has so much as mentioned this para-
mount consideration in all the millions of words printed in 
regard to the war. 
Omissions of all reference to a point so vital in the ques-
tion of war guilt indicates something gravely missing in the 
alleged honesty of American journalism. 
f32l 
Defining the Aggressor 
The League of Nations sessions at which J apan was 
called the aggressor were dominated by Soviet Commissar 
Maxim Litvinoff, known also as Finkelstein. He dominated 
the Brussels Conference likewise. 
Note that no group sent a delegation to gather evidence 
on causes of the. conflict. Such would have put on paper 
evidence which the Moscow ring against Japan very much 
wanted to keep off paper. 
The League blundered badly in 1931 when it sent out 
the Lytton Commission to gather facts. The Lytton Com-
mission findings showed an embarrassing array of Chinese 
provocations. The League didn't make that mistake again 
in 1937. Directed by Comrade Litvinoff it took action for 
China, Moscow's al ly, without any inquiry-a procedure as 
high-handed as would be a judgment without evidence in an 
ordinary court case. 
League pronouncements are important for publicity ef-
fects. They impress persons who suppose the League an 
impartial body-unaware that every government instructs 
its League delegates according to its own schemes. Under 
such conditions there can be no disinterested verdict. 
League publicity to sensationalize China as a victim 
of aggression was backed in America by publicity to picture 
the Chinese as particularly peaceful people. This was 
hardly in accord with the evidence. For decades the Chinese 
have fought constantly among themselves . As a nation 
they have never shown ability either to get on with others 
or even to get on with one another. Rated by frequency 
of civil wars and totals of slaughter, China's record is one 
of the bloodiest known to history. By specific comparison, 
past or present, China's record is far more strife-ridden than 
Japan's. 
[33] 
The Odd Spectacle 
Thus we have an odd spectacle. A nation experienced 
two revolts within six months to force its government into 
war. Its dictator was kidnapped and held prisoner to force 
him into an agreement for war. Its soldiers were on de-
militarized ground when war began. For years its radical 
students paraded constantly with banners calling for war. 
Its politicians who advocated peace were beaten or shot. 
But that nation, China, when it finally got the war its radical 
factions clamored for, was declared by organized pro-red 
publicity in America to have been jumped on without prov-
ocation. 
Did Japan Want War? 
Japan's Army 
Standard American references list the total of Japan's 
regular army just prior to present hostilities at 257,000 men. 
Thus Japan's standing army strength was about one-
ninth of China's standing army strength. According to Wal-
ter Duranty, N. Y. Times correspondent, the Soviet Union 
as far back as 1936 had 400,000 troops stationed in the Vladi-
vostok area, fronting on Japan's Korean border. Elsewhere, 
according to the Soviet Union's own figures and neutral 
estimates, the Soviet Union had an additiona l standing army 
of nearly I ,000,000 men. 
So on her Chinese border Japan faced about nine times 
her own army strength in man power and on her Soviet 
border about five times her own strength in armed man 
power. China and the Soviet Union were potentially in a 
military alliance. Japan faced about 14 times her own 
stre,ngth in combined. hostile forces. 
Meanwhile America and Britain were unfriendly and 
diplomatically on the side of the Soviets. But during this 
critical period, from 1933 to 1937, Japan increased her army 
[34] 
by only 27,000 men. Japan's army remained one of the 
smallest among world powers, while her two neighbors, the 
most militaristic in the world in numbers of troops, strained 
every resource to increase their strength month by month. 
Facts and Generalities 
Each of the foregoing statements can be substantiated. 
Such facts do not bear out the sensational charges, in Amer-
ican newspapers eager for aU. S. Soviet alliance, that Japan's 
policy has been one of "mad dog militarism" challenging 
America and the rest of the world . No other nation in his-
tory, facing for years a situation so critical , has kept its 
armed forces so small in relation to the potential threat of 
such a combination of power at its very borders. 
It is very significant that newspapers which constantly 
refer to Japan's creation of a "mighty military machine" 
very carefully avoid stating the exact size of that "mighty 
military machine." The same papers are equally careful, 
in their sensationalism about helpless China being jumped 
on by a "foe armed to the teeth," to avoid comparing the 
size of Japan's army prior to the fighting with the size of 
China's forces. 
A hate campaign which must rely on concealment of 
important facts must be weak from the standpoint of specific 
evidence. The drive to stir needless hatred of Japan bears 
all the indications of being a repetition of the 1917 war 
propaganda technique. 
The question for thinking Ame.ricans is this: Will our 
next conflict be a bona fide defence of this country against 
a real enemy or a framed-up conflict to gratify propaganda 
liars here at home? 
If there is any sound reason for us to view Japan as an 
enemy, the war-mongers have not yet produced it. Instead, 
their concealment of so many known particulars plus their 
(35] 
Rarely 
Mentioned ... 
It is rarely mentioned that in 1922 
J apan voluntarily returned to China 
Shantung concessions won from Ge r-
many in the World War. The hate 
campaign against J apan call s for 
avoiding all facts which might sub-
tract from the publicity picture of 
j apan as fiercely grabbing everything 
in sight, madly bent on world con-
quest . 
sensationalizing of obvious hokum, plus the fact that ring-
leade.rs in the hate campaign are known Soviet sympathizers, 
all tend to show that the drive to stir trouble with Japan 
proceeds from the hope of getting America to fight for the 
Soviets in Asia. 
The Tanaka Memorial 
Much publicity has been gtven m America to what is 
called the Tanaka Memorial. This is allegedly a plan of 
Japanese ambitions of conquest, beginning with China and 
leading to war with America. It came to American atten-
tion through Chinese publicity sources, with a statement 
that it was a scheme submitted to the Emperor of Japan by 
an official named Tanaka. 
There are many specific facts which do not bear out 
charges that the Japanese are bent on conquest in the man-
ner outlined in what Chinese assert to be the Tanaka 
Memorial. 
[36] 
Voluntarily, Japan returned to China in 1922 the Shan-
tung properties won from Germany in the World War. 
Japan's relatively small army, one-ninth the size of China's 
prior to the present conflict, would hardly indicate ade.quate 
preparation to fight China alone, not to mention America 
and the rest of the world. 
Japan's peace offer to China in January of 1938, with 
a view to ending the present war, did not demand an inch of 
Chinese territory. The main demand was that anti-Japanese 
violence and agitation of the sort causing the massacre of 
Japanese civilians at T ungchow be suppressed. 
If the Japanese were looking for conflict with China, 
as the Tanaka Memorial says, there were numerous provo-
cations between 1927, the date Chinese claim the Tanaka 
Memorial was drafted, and 1937, the date present fighting 
began. In 1927, in fact, the British Government, now allied 
with Moscow against Japan, appealed to Japan to send troops 
to China to help defend British lives against Chiang Kai-
shek's anti-British drive. If japan wished to attack China, 
that was a splendid opportunity-with British approval. At 
any time prior to 1937, Japan could have attacked Chiang 
when he was less well equipped with imported foreign arms. 
During years prior to 1937, too, Chinese militarists repeat-
edly sought Japanese aid, promising all sorts of concessions 
in return for aid resulting in victory over other Chinese fac-
tions . These were refused by Japan. 
Altogether, the evidence does not support the theory of 
the Tanaka Memorial. There is no evidence that the J ap-
anese fight on less provocation than America or any other 
country. J apan's territorial gains per war have been no 
more, when war came, than those of America, Britain, 
France, and other powers. So far as specific evidence goes, 
there is no more reason to suppose the Japanese plan to at-
tack us than there is to entertain the same suspicion respect-
ing other nations. 
-
Besides such external evidence, there are discrepancies 
within the alleged memorial which tend to discredit it. On 
page 1 it purports to describe an interview participated in by 
Prince Aritomo Yamagata, Japanese statesman, after the 
Nine Power Conference of 1922. But Yamagata was dead 
at the time of the supposed interview, and was dead even 
before the Nine Power Treaty was signed-a fact confirm-
able in the Encyclopaedia Britannica or any other standard 
reference. 
A "memorial" containing such absurdities may make 
good publicity to se.ek entanglement of America abroad, but 
it can hardly gain the credence of thinking people. 
[38] 
Red Plans for 
Waron]apan 
In this booklet Chinese reds te ll of 
plans to start war on japan to "unify 
China" and also regain Manchukuo. 
On page 41 Mao Tse-tung, red chief, 
says: " It is the immediate task of 
China to regain all our lost terri-
tories." This was published in 
English in America two months be-
fore fighting began. Chinese reds did 
not talk of war to regain Mongolia, 
taken by Soviets in 1923. (See map 
page 14). By calling for war on 
japan, an anti-red nation , they could 
count on favorable publicity in U. S. 
papers. Red publicity connections 
a re so good here that any ally of 
Moscow is called a victim of aggres-
sion, even if it announces in advance 
its plan to attack-as in this case. 
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Rarely Mentioned 
U. S. papers eager to stir hatred of Japan carefully 
avoid mentioning that Chiang Kai-shek came into power 
in 1927 on a program of driving Americans and British 
from China. He was then in an alliance with the reds. His 
propaganda chief was Gusenbe.rg, lent by Moscow, who 
used the Russian name Borodin. American men, women, 
and children were wantonly slain then by the same Chinese 
officials pleading friendship to get our aid now. 
r39 i 
Opium 
When Chinese civil wars became chronic after the 
World War, cultivation of opium was revived on a tremen-
dous scale throughout China to raise funds for Chinese 
militarists. Anti-opium edicts were now and then an-
nounced, but opium remained a chief source of official 
revenue over most of China. 
Above picture was taken about seve,n miles from the 
writer's home near F oochow, China, in 1932.¥ It shows 
poppies planted by public orders of Fang Shun-tao, then No. 
1 Chinese official there. U. S. papers seeking trouble with 
Japan avoid such facts, shouting Japanese "introduce" 
opium into China. In territory of Chinese population they 
control, Japanese require licenses for opium shops. British 
in Singapore and other British territories of Chinese popula-
tion have the same requirement, which U. S. hate cam-
paigners against Japan don't mention. Both British and 
Japanese adopted licensing system for Chinese after futile 
suppression efforts. 
*See Ch. V III , Ways Tbat Are Dark- Tbe Trutb About Cbiua, by Ralph 
Townsend. 1933. In bookstores, li braries, or from G. P. Putn am's Sons, Pub-
lishers, 2 West 45th St., ·ew York City, price ~3 .00. 
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Flf•Mt ~<'TUPF'S- "IOWiftD lii£W:,PifPE~CHNH1~Y 1..1, ~~ 3 f' Night Maneuvers by Tokio Soldiers, in 
~ Area Forbidden by Treaty, Started 
Fighting Which Has tasted a Year 
The Sino-japanese tllar is in its :second ,year, with Chinese resistance more stubborn than it has e"er 
been. In this series of articles Jack Fader, who has lra\Jeled in the Far Ea!.l, will tell in detail the little 
~nown incidenb rvhic/t started the war, and JtJill attempt to count the gains and loue.s in the Jir.sl year 
of fighjing Information for the .series was gathered /rom private sources in the For Ea!.l and in Wa.sh· 
~ inglon, as well as /rom preu Jisplaches.- The Editor. ...., 
BY JACK FOSTER 
Scripps-Howard Staff Writer ~ 
On the night of July 7, 1937, a 
body of Japanese troops was holding 
manuevers on the sandy stretches 
near Marco Polo Bridge, whose ~ white stone lions look indifferently ~ down at the murky Yungting River, 
10 miles southwest of Peiping. 
There was no honest reason why 
they should be there, on Chinese 
&Oil. The maneuvers had been going 
~ on for over a week. They should 
have ended days before. Further-
more, the Boxer Treaty strictly for-
~bade foreign troop movement~~ in ~ this area. ~ ..._ Neverti:J_el~s~ marching s.round in • 
Falsities Stirring Hate 
-
Photostat from San Francisco 
News of july 13 , 1938. It typifies 
falsities by which needless trouble 
is invited for us in Asia. If such 
misrepresentations were omitted 
from the hate campaign there 
would be no hate campaign. The 
facts alone provide no occasion 
for ill-will on our part. 
It is very odd that so many newspapers repeat from 
day to day hate-stirring falsities after conscientious persons 
have called attention to errors. 
Completely absurd is the second paragraph of the item 
above. Article IX of the Boxer Protocol of 1901 expressly 
provides that in the future foreign powers, including Japan, 
would be privileged to keep troops in the area cited. The 
text of this is readily available. What explains the mis-
representation? 
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AMERICANS AND BRITISH JauED IN ATTACKS AT NANKING; 
WARSHiPS THEN SHELL CITY AND RESCUE SOME FOREIGNERS; 
ALLIED CQMMANDERS SERVE ULTIMATUM; ALL CHINA AFLAME 
ffllWL~TAftlEM '" .. u-.=~-·PttiSnN£DWHfStJ c.: .. ~~{~Atr$1l1111 ,._=---=-~~ ·lll-llUIB 
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In 1927 
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--
---
.......... ,... 
...... ~..-: .... 
---
Chiang Kai-shek' s party was in its first red alliance and 
busy against British in China. Britain appealed to Japan 
to send Japanese troops to help save British lives and prop-
erty. Later Britain became a diplomatic ally of the Soviet 
Union. Red publicity against Japan in America is designed 
to draw America into the British-French-Soviet alliance 
dominated by Soviets. 
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BLAMES THE SOVIET < 
FOR EVEN'fS IN CHINA 
British Envoy Here Declares 
Reds Incite "Ignorant Coolies" 
to "Violence and Pillage." 
He Hints in Worcester Speech ) 
That Cantonese, Like Turks, Are 
Using Bolshevism as a Tool. I 
Special to TM 'New York Time•· 
WORCESTER, Man., March 211.-
1t Charging that the €hlneae attack.e on 
the Brltleh, American.. and other for-
eigners In Shanghai, Nanking and 
other parts ot China are directly In-
spired by the Russian Soviet Govern-
ment, S1r Esme Howard, British Am· 
bassador to the United States, In an 
·address before the Metal Trades and 
Employers' Association tonight, said 
that the present trouble In China 'ltaa 
the first step In a Bolehevlst plan t~ 
I drive the British and all torelgnera from China and ultimately effect a 
Bolshevist revolution throughout the 
world. 
Shanghai Say• 30 AmericCUI$ 
Arf Missing crt Nanking 
SHANGHAI, Saturday, Mareb 2& 
(!1').-A check-up· !rom all a.eoouDt.s 
which had reached 8hangha1 up to 
10 o'clock thl& morning lndleated 
that thirty Americans were sUII UD· 
accounted !or at Nanklnc.. It was 
1mpoeslble to te!l their fate. 
Hopes or ultimate rescue of those 
alive, however, were brighter aa the 
Cantonese leader bad changed his 
attitude · under the threat of an· 
other Anglo-American bombard· 
ment. 
Special to The 'New York Times. 
WASHINGTON, March 211.-The 
State Departm ent received a cable 
tonight !rom Clarence E. Gau1a. 
Consul General at Shanghai, atat· 
lng that two shiploads or re!ugeea 
f rom Nanking will arrive at Shang-
hai tomorrow. 
According to the Consul at Nan· 
king, many or the refugees are dee· 
tltute and will require aselstance. 
REFUGEES SPEEDING 
FROM DANGER ZONE 
NV. t;i'P(e5, NAif. 2 f,, ~., 
Group That Left Nanking Before 
Latest Outbreak Arrives 
Safely at Shanghai. 
Sp~c ial to Tile New York Time•. 
Sir Esme said that at all coeta 
the British Government would defend 
the Uvea, property and treaty rights 
ot British nllllonals In China and that 
WASHINGTON, March 211.-The safe 
' a rriva l at Sha.nghal of forty-nine 
Compare Britain's official attitude toward reds in 1927, 
when British were their target, with Britain's attitude in 
1937-38 when Japanese have been the target of reds. 
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rf{•Y, /IMfS I Mil /(, 1 (p I '!Cf ..< .,_ PA & 1: J 
T ut ot tlae Message bJ Admiral Hough at Nt~t~kin, 
Which Re1ulted in tlae Decision to Shell tlae City 
B7 FREDEIUCK MOORE. 
Copyrldlt, lnJ, b)' Tbe Mew rork '1'1- CoaiJIUI7, 
Specl&l Cat>le Lo TBa N8W To&JI Tl .... 
SHANGHAI, :March 26.-Tht message from Rear Aclmlnl B. 
H. Hough, at Nankiag, to Admiral C. S. Williams, CommBD4er-ln~ 
Chief at Shanghai, which renltecl in the third ultimatum and the 
liberation of the foreignera follows: 
1 do not believe that lbe det.Jie of the altuaUon are eomptetety 
understood by the Comat&IU1er-ID·Ohlet. 
1 agree with the Brttleb HDior officer preeeDt that UDlea our 
nattona.le are promptly re.l_.ed, and dl!llveNd at lbe B11D4. 4rUUc 
acUon muet be taken In order to ave tbe line of tboH ....,.,.,. Ia 
tbe city. Tbere are wounded aahore who eannot NOlin attaUoD aD4 
abould not be D'lflectecl furUltr. lQcludln~ the Brttlab OODaul a..raL 
I beUeve that radse.l acUoD woWcl P~WVYe Una aD4 tlu1Jlu 411&7 
would de!•t tbl.l ~bllll7. 
I believe that the abWlla« of mlllt&r7 palata, ayql4lq l1lJ1U'J' to tile 
civil 'POPUlace aa much u poactbl., would at tbl.I .Ume haYe acen.t 
effect upon the port aa4 aloq the rlYer. 
I have 1uet rec.Jv .. lUI ......Sve aa4 hulolent reply tram U.. ~ 
army commander. ~ I conalcler that It ooacnte actloa Ia not takm ftftnly &84 ._.. 
dlately here lbe Uvea ol tba rematAinc BrltJ•h &Del Amerlcau ..,- be 
toat and all Brltilh uad AmerSOana muat promptlY ·~ the 
Yan~&e Valley In order to ave thelr lives. 
Unlea otherwt.e lutnl*cl &Del IUtl~A the .ttuaU. ra4loaJl1 
chanKea 1 wtti 1otDUY wiU. \be British late this attenaooa sbell . the 
aallent military petnta allcl mllltary yamea. 
I am aendln« a final 'WIU'DlD« by a ChiD ... ID11It.ar7 orclell7. 
Cb&DR K&l-ahek'• arrival 111 problemaUc&l ab4 we do DOt ~­
tb&t under the8e oondlu- be 1s .,_. enou,rb to odlltrol the llltqaUoD 
even If be ao duirea er abovld arrtn 1D Ume to ave the ,....,.,.., 
llve8. BOVOK. 
s,.., to ~ ,.., rM• n.ee. 
WASHINGTON, Mardi 25 -Admiral C. 8. Wi~Uaaw'a rep})' to 
Rear Admiral Hou.rh'a meaaap asking permiAion to sbell lfaaldbr 
follows: 
Uae your owu Ju«KJM~~t 1D hlndlln« the altuatlon. 
WJTliA~ 
The British Conunande~ln-Chlef NDt a similar J11US1110 to tM 
commanding officer of tile c:raiMr Emerald at NanldJis. 
Facing a similar situation, America's attitude m 1927 
was as stern as Japan's in 1937. 
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Red Publicity Power 
Readers who seek a balanced perspective of foreign 
affairs will do well to ponder all implications of the follow-
ing facts: 
When Bolivia and Paraguay were warring not long 
ago, not a single American paper sought to name the ag-
gressor. There were no mass meetings- no protests. Why? 
The distinction of that war was that neither side was an 
ally of Moscow. It is only in conflicts between red and 
anti-red forces, as in China and in Spain now-that our 
press is suddenly interested in naming the "aggressor". The 
"aggressor" is always the anti-red side. There was no 
political or publicity capital for reds in the Bolivia-Paraguay 
war. Hence lack of sensationalism concerning it here. 
U. S. papers kept quiet during years of pro-red Me.x-
ico' s closing of churches and expulsions of priests, but 
raised a mighty wail over far less restrictive religious meas-
ure.s in anti-red nations. 
Confiscation of hundreds of million dollars worth of 
U. S. oil and other properties by pro-red Mexico stirred very 
little objection in most U. S. papers. But temporary occu-
pation of obscure American mission property by Japanese 
in China-worth at most a few hundred dollars-stirred 
violent blasts of fury. Japan is an anti-red nation. 
There was more furore in Washington over news 
later that Mexico was selling the oil to Japan and Germany 
- anti-red nations-than there had been over Mexico's con-
fiscation of it from American owners. U. S. criticism of the 
oil seizure became crusty only after learning who'd get 
the oil. 
The minute France began to go red in a big way under 
Leon Blum two years ago, U. S. papers began to praise 
France to the skies, though France had done nothing else 
to account for this mysterious sudden torrent of American 
press e,ulogies. Certainly France had come no nearer pay-
ing long-standing debts. Meanwhile U. S. papers carefully 
avoid mentioning that Japan, an anti-red nation, is the only 
world power to pay all debts to us at all times, with never 
a dollar of default or delay. France is an ally of Moscow. 
Japan's bombing of the Panay was sensationalized 
with all sorts of war talk. China's equivalent bombing of 
the S. S. Hoover at sea, and China's bombing of the Inter-
national Settlement at Shanghai, killing and injuring Amer-
icans, we,re neatly hushed up. China is an ally of Moscow. 
Nothing much was said in America about Austria's 
debt as long as it was Austria's debt. The moment Austria 
was merged with Germany and the debt could be charged 
to Germany, an anti-red nation, U. S. papers let loose a 
mighty howl. Yet the amount owed, and the principle in-
volved, were the same in both cases. 
Sensationalism to involve America in Asia claims the 
issue there is "democracy". But neither Japan nor China 
is a democracy. There was never a popular election in 
China during all the 4,000 years of that country's history. 
Chiang Kai-shek, present dictator, got his power by fighting 
for it. Japan, a constitutional monarchy much similar to 
that of England, with control over taxes and appropriations 
by an elected Diet, is not a democracy in the correct sense 
of the word. Nor is Japan in any sense fascistic, having 
no dictator and retaining control of finances and most other 
agencie.s of government by elected representatives. 
Papers seeking to entangle America in Asia avoid 
calling Chiang Kai-shek a dictator-calling him "generalis-
simo"-which conceals the fact that China is the world's 
second severest dictatorship. 
Affairs are not yet ripe in America to praise the Soviet 
Union direct in average papers. Instead, they praise. every 
military and diplomatic ally of the Soviet Union. If U. S. 
backing can be achieved for Moscow's allies, that is nearly 
as good as direct backing for Moscow. Hence. the avoidance 
of "red" applied to Moscow allies and substitution of 
"democracy"-which sounds better to American ears. 
Readers may judge for themselves the extent to which 
Ame.rican papers play this publicity game deliberately or 
as dupes of a publicity machine such as was created to drag 
us into war in Europe in 1917. 
"Territorial aggression" is not a real issue, in evidence 
of which papers attacking Japan on that point avoid men-
tioning the Soviets' 1923 grab of Mongolia. American 
papers backed Japan, whatever territory Japan took, as long 
as Japan was an opponent of the Czar, then turned anti-
Japanese after 191 7-as soon as Japan was viewed by 
strong forces here as an opponent of the "New Russia." 
Anything which can be construed as an "atrocity" is 
sensationalized regarding all anti-red nations-and con-
cealed or played down regarding any ally of Moscow. 
Britain's recent bombings of Indian civilian villages and 
France's bombings of North African villages are not dis-
cussed in average U. S. papers. England and France are 
allied with Moscow. Chiang Kai-shek killed thousands of 
Chinese civilians in his civil wars. Doubtless his bombings 
were. not intended to do so. But as in Japan's case, any 
air attack on military objectives in crowded China brings 
serious civilian tolls. The point is that the same events 
headlined against anti-reds are. kept quiet if involving any 
Moscow ally. 
Such publicity examples reveal trends in current sen-
sationalism. Linkage with alien politics is plain. It is in-
deed a spectacle of hypocrisy that those seeking to embroil 
us abroad refer to principles of "civilization" and "honor", 
when their efforts are based so largely upon deception and 
outright lying. 
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America's Position 
In poin ting out that we have no cause to hate 1 apan, 
the re is no intended suggestion tha t anybody in America 
should be pro-1 apanese. 
Being pro-anything in foreign strife invites trouble. 
Our partisanism either way is unwarranted. There has been 
nothing in Japan's relations with us to deserve our hatred 
of Japan. Nor has there been anything in China's relations 
with us to deserve. our support of China. 
Past favors to China brought us no thanks, as proved 
by repeated anti-American campaigns led by Chinese of-
ficials for political motives. T hey now plead all sorts of 
esteem for us- now that t hey want our aid again. But it 
was this same group of Chinese who came into power on an 
anti-American program, when that was expedient in 1927. 
Talk of "aiding democracy" and "resisting dictatorship" 
was proved publicity bait by schemers to entangle us for 
their own aims in the past. It would be so again if Amer-
icans once more succumbed to the same bait. It is well to 
remember that both after 1898 and 1918 we were scorned 
and hated by the people our interv:e.ntion was allegedly de-
signed to aid. And it is particularly absurd to talk of "aid-
ing democracy" in China, where democracy neve.r existed. 
America is now in t he pecul ia rly fortunate position of 
having no coun try as an enemy. W hy spoi l t hi s good for-
tune? On a basis of facts , as dist inct from minority hate 
propaganda, we have no cause to quarrel with the 1 apanese. 
They want our good wi ll. By avoiding partisanism we can 
keep on reasonably friendly terms with both Chinese and 
1 apanese. D'oing so wi ll be to our advantage and con-
tribute to world stabi lization. Very pl ainly, the choice for 
cordial relations is ours. 
We Have No Enemies in Asia! 
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